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Chapter 2 – Hatching Wars Without End 
In the 21st century, the Bush administration has displayed broad lists of over sixty countries 
where the terrorist group “Al Qaeda” is presumed to be active and hence U.S. military 
intervention may be required. Waging the war on terror has been substituted for the Cold War 
containment of communism as the rationale behind the latest invasions. This drive for U.S. world 
hegemony has been waged for over half a century.  
A reader who has not been alert to the idea that the U.S. government has been on a drive 
for unlimited hegemonic power may not recall the frequency and scale of U.S. military 
operations since the close of World War II. So here is a partial roster of wars, large and small 
operated by the U.S. government since then:  
 
PHILIPPINES (1948-54) CIA directs war against Huk Rebellion. 
KOREA (1951-53) U.S.& South Korea fight China & North Korea to stalemate; Atomic 
bomb threat in 1950, & vs. China in 1953.  
IRAN (1953) CIA overthrows democracy, installs Shah. 
LEBANON (1958) Marine occupation against rebels 
VIETNAM (1960-75) Fought South Vietnam revolt & North Vietnam; 1-2 million killed in 
longest U.S. war; atomic bomb threats in 1968 and 1969. 
CUBA (1961) CIA-directed exile invasion fails. 
INDONESIA (1965) Million killed in CIA-assisted army coup. 
GUATEMALA (1966-67) Green Berets intervene against rebels. 
CAMBODIA (1969-75) Up to 2 million killed in decade of bombing, starvation, and 
political chaos. 
LEBANON (1982-84) Marines expel PLO and back Phalangists, Navy bombs and shells 
Muslim and Syrian positions. 
PANAMA (1989-90) Nationalist government ousted by 27,000 soldiers, leaders arrested, 
2000+ killed. 
IRAQ I (1990-2003) Blockade, air strikes; 200,000+ killed in invasion of Iraq; no-fly zone, 
large-scale destruction of Iraqi military. 
SOMALIA (1992-94) U.S.-led United Nations occupation during civil war; raids against one 
Mogadishu faction. 
AFGHANISTAN I (1998) Attack on former CIA training camps used by Islamic 
fundamentalist groups alleged to have attacked embassies.1 
AFGHANISTAN II (2003-preset) Invasion and occupation following 9/11 attacks. Taliban 
regime toppled. Hung for Osama bin Laden remains unsuccessful. Estimated 3,485 Afghan 
civilians killed and 6,273 seriously injured as of July 2004.2 
IRAQ II (2003-present) Invasion of Iraq by 140,000 soldiers to topple Sadam Hussein, 
followed by occupation and violent insurgency. 26,568 Iraqi civilians killed and 47,822 
seriously injured as of August 2005. 3 
 
THE U.S. PREFERENCE FOR MILITARY ENGAGEMENT 
The Department of Defense and other proponents of U.S. wars like to speak as though the 
U.S. wages war only as a last resort. The histories of both Vietnam and Iraq show that non-
military, diplomatic procedures were available for resolving disputes with the U.S. and were 
rejected in both cases. Tragically, these peaceful options were spurned by top U.S. 
government executives.  
 
“Vietnam, rather than being the exception, is the pattern for the future.” 
This forecast was made in July 1966 by the editors of Armed Forces 
Management, a Washington-based military trade journal. The editors wrote 
further: “Reasoning that poverty breeds violence, defense planners expect 
the incidence of conflict to increase in the future and be concentrated in 
the Southern Hemisphere – in Africa, along the littoral of the Asian 
subcontinent and in South America. While the United States eschews the 
role of global gendarme, it will help those nations, which ask for its help. 
The prospects then are more American involvement in some of the most 
primitive areas of the world.” 
 
This prognosis was shared by the Department of Defense, which was planning for U.S. 
participation in future wars of intervention. In his 1966 and 1967 statements to the Congress 
on budgets and defense programs, Secretary of Defense McNamara discussed prospects for 
internal wars in various parts of the world, including Laos, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Iraq, 
Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Guatemala, Uruguay, the Philippines, Nigeria, the Congo, 
Ghana, Uganda and Burundi. The Secretary of Defense stated that civil wars in these 
countries would require military intervention by the United States, akin to U.S. actions in 
Vietnam.4 
At one point in their quite separate histories, Ho Chi Minh, for Vietnam, and Saddam 
Hussein, for Iraq, each sought political accommodation, a modus vivendi, with the United 
States government.  
By the end of World War II in 1945, Vietnamese nationalists had fought Japanese and 
French conquerors. Iraq, at the end of the 20th century, had been bloodied by wars with Iran 
and a failed attempt at conquest of Kuwait. Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and Saddam Hussein 
in Iraq, judged that their ambitions for economic development would be frustrated by 
further war making. In order to avoid conflict with the vastly superior U.S. military, both 
leaders proposed major changes in their relations with the U.S. Both were rebuffed by the 
U.S. government, which had chosen instead to dictate terms after achieving military 
domination.  
On February 16, 1946, Ho Chi Minh addressed the U.S. in a letter to President Truman. 
He offered an account of the decades-long struggles of Vietnamese nationalists for 
independence, and concluded with a proposal to the U.S.: 
 
What we ask has been graciously granted to the Philippines. Like the 
Philippines our goal is full independence and full cooperation with the 
United States. We will do our best to make this independence and 
cooperation profitable to the whole world. 
 
I am, Dear Mr. President,  
 
Respectfully yours,  
 
Ho Chi Minh 
5 
 
President Truman did not reply, or even acknowledge, Ho Chi Minh’s proposal. 
Now in 2004, we learn that Saddam Hussein too had sought a political accommodation 
with the U.S., in this case by means of “back channel” approaches to the U.S. government.6  
 In February 2003 Hassan al-Obeidi, chief of foreign operations of the Iraqi Intelligence 
Service, met with Imad Hage, a Lebanese-American businessman in his Beirut office. Mr. 
Obeidi told Mr. Hage that Iraq would make deals to avoid war, including helping in the 
Mideast peace process. He said, “If this is about oil, we will talk about U.S. oil concessions… 
If this is about weapons of mass destruction, let the Americans send over their people…” 
Mr. Obeidi said Iraq could agree to hold elections within the next two years. Further, Tahir 
Jalil Habbush, Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, in a showing of cooperation and 
concession to President Bush, offered to hand over to the U.S. Abdul Rahman Yasin who 
had been indicted in the U.S. in connection with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.  
These proposals were passed on to senior Pentagon officials including Richard N. Perle, 
an influential Pentagon advisor. Perle, said The New York Times account, sought authorization 
from the C.I.A. to meet with the Iraqis, but the U.S. officials declined to pursue this channel 
saying they had already engaged in contacts with Baghdad. Said Perle, “The message was 
‘Tell them that we will see them in Baghdad.’ ” The New York Times reporting included no 
indication of State Department activity with respect to these Iraqi overtures that apparently 
had the approval of Saddam Hussein.7 
In Vietnam, and again in Iraq, the U.S. government preferred to seek power by military 
means. The Vietnam War cost the lives of 58,000 U.S. servicemen & women. The 
Vietnamese suffered millions of dead. The toll of deaths and grave injuries taken in Iraq 
increases daily.  
In both Vietnam and Iraq the American government chose war over diplomacy despite 
the high cost of military operations, both in lives and money. The power extension allowed 
by the war—including the construction of new military bases abroad—was ample reward. 
There was also a windfall for the companies supplying military goods and services, 
Halliburton being a major beneficiary from the war in Iraq. In 2000, the Pentagon’s “Base 
Structure Report” accounts for more than 512 U.S. bases on foreign soil. These bases 
project U.S. military might into additional foreign lands, preparing for future engagements, 
and thereby increasing the power of the DoD and the White House.  
 
PLANTING BASES WORLDWIDE 
From the middle of the twentieth century until 2004, U.S. wars in Vietnam and Iraq have 
played a central part in the drive by American state-corporate managers to extend their 
hegemonic* control. The U.S. war in Vietnam lasted for 15 years and U.S. military operations 
in and around Iraq, at this writing, have continued for more than ten years. These wars are 
now being used as the rationale for Pentagon planning of elaborate new military bases and 
power extension. 
What is the cost of wars without end?  
 
The United States military operation in Vietnam sought to overcome the 
political support of the National Liberation Front by means of high-
technology-applied destructive power. U.S. forces spent $1.8 billion on 
heavy-construction programs in Vietnam, including about 1,500 separate 
projects: 6 new deep-water ports; 8 shallow-draft ports; 8 jet air bases; 80 
auxiliary airfields; hundreds of miles of pipelines and roads; barracks for 
more than 600,000 men. At peak, the United States contractors operated 
                                                
* hegemony – Leadership, preponderant influence or authority, esp. of a government or state – 
hegemonic, adj. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, G. and C. Merriam Co., 1949. 
enough earth-moving, construction, and concrete plants to dig the Suez 
Canal in 18 months and surface the New Jersey Turnpike every 30 days; a 
new “Pentagon West” housed the general staff; the Cam Ranh Bay harbor 
development cost $110 million and the allied depot was slated to be the 
largest in the world, with 3 million square feet of covered and open storage 
space.8 
 
All told, the U.S. spent about $400,000 per enemy killed. 9 Clearly, the technological and 
military resources expended in Vietnam were governed by the understanding that “money is 
no object”.  
Currently the bill for the war in Iraq is running at more than $200 billion.10 
 
TOWARD HEGEMONY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND BEYOND 
In a highly informative dispatch to the Washington Post, February 9, 2002, Vernon Loeb 
reported on the expanding array of U.S. military bases in Central Asia.  
 
BISHKEK, Kyrgyzstan -- In a remote corner of Central Asia, in a country 
that didn’t even exist a decade ago, the U.S. Air Force is building a base 
that within months will be home to 3,000 personnel and nearly two dozen 
American and allied aircraft … 
… It embodies what senior U.S. defense officials say is a major 
commitment to maintain not just air operations over Afghanistan for the 
foreseeable future but also a robust military presence in the region well 
after the war… 
“I think it’s fair to say there will be a long-term presence here well beyond 
the end of hostilities,” said Air Force Col. Billy Montgomery, commander 
of a team of engineers, technicians and planners that is proceeding apace 
with construction of a tent city, surgical ward, gym, hot showers and 
kitchen facilities at the airport… 
…U.S. officials say the deployment of American forces eastward from the 
Gulf to the doorstep of China since Sept. 11 also underscores a significant 
shift in the Bush administration’s thinking about the role of the military in 
projecting American power… 
…“America will have a continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of 
a kind that we could not have dreamed of before,” Secretary of State Colin 
L. Powell told the House International Relations Committee on 
Wednesday. [Feb 6. 2002]” 
 
Agreements for establishing or using preexisting bases were also made with Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Pakistan, Oman and Kuwait. 
 
… more than 50,000 U.S. military personnel now live and work on ships 
and bases stretching from Turkey to Oman and eastward to the Manas 
airport, 19 miles outside of Bishkek and 300 miles from the Chinese 
border. 
…Manas … is a functioning international airport with a long runway 
originally built for Soviet bombers, navigation aids that are up to 
commercial standards, good fuel facilities and a large ramp for parking 
aircraft. … 
“I don’t see anything that we’re doing that indicates that we’re going to be 
here for three months,” [Air Force Brig. Gen. Christopher] Kelly said. “I 
see what we’re doing and the kind of guidance I’m getting from higher 
headquarters that indicate that we’ll be here for a long period of time. How 
long, I don’t know.” 
 
The scale of this worldwide campaign is revealed in the three maps that follow. The first 
focuses on Afghanistan and is aptly titled, “Preparing For A Long Stay” (First published, Jan 
8, 2002.) 11The second map shows U.S. deployments in the array of countries in the Middle 
East and Central Asia.12 The Central Asia base expansions locate U.S. military power within 
300 miles of China. U.S. airpower is amplified by the aircraft and facilities on the island of 
Diego Garcia, a British military base island in the Indian Ocean that is shared with the U.S.  
The third map is based on an aerial photograph of the U.S. military base at Al Udeid in 
Qatar. The second map of U.S. deployments locates Al Udeid airbase at the southeast corner 
of Arabia. This particular base has special importance as it includes two runways, each more 
than two miles in length, plus an array of storage and command facilities that are suited for a 
military command center for the whole Central Asia area. The Al Udeid base facilities are 
sufficient to equip the major part of an entire armored division. The implied strategy is that 
the troops can be readily flown in to a target area and could quickly take control and operate 
all the major equipment that otherwise would require a long period for transportation from 
the United States. 13 
 

 
These U.S. bases represent a huge investment and will not be abandoned voluntarily. For 
these bases allow the Pentagon to project ever more force over more territory and hence set 
the stage for numerous acts of regime change and their subsequent guerilla wars.  
 
UNIFORMED FORCES AND CORPORATE WARRIORS 
The Pentagon’s Directorate for Information Operations and Reports gives us the following 
information on U.S. Active Duty Military Personnel as of March 31, 2003: 
 
US Active Duty Military 
Personnel 
US and Territories 1,161,229 
Total Europe  117,883 
Total - Former Soviet 
Union  
167 
Total - East Asia and 
Pacific  
98,624 
Total - North Africa, 
Near East, and South 
Asia  
17,279 
Total - Sub-Saharan 
Africa  
377 
Total - Western 
Hemisphere  
1,721 
Total - Undistributed  17,237 
Total Iraqi Freedom 269,363 
 
But these “U.S. Active Duty Military Personnel” are not the whole military force that the 
U.S. government deploys directly. The other part are the “estimated 10-20,000 “private 
contractors” working overseas for the Defense and State departments, many of them in 
combat zones.”14 National Public Radio, on November 7, 2003 detailed some of the activity 
of “Private Military Firms” that have been operating with “an estimated $100 billion a year in 
revenue.” “Private contractors,” NPR reported, “now help the U.S. military and State 
departments with everything from security and satellite mapping to laundry and food 
service.” NPR’s Eric Westervelt reported that “not all the jobs are mundane”… “DynCorp 
employees do everything from guarding Afghan President Hamid Karzai under a State 
Department contract, to making vaccines for smallpox and anthrax.”  
Peter Singer, author of Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry detailed 
for the first time many of the salient features of “the rise of the privatized military industry.” 
Indeed, the appendix to that book includes a listing of 60 Private Military Firms and their 
websites. His account of these firms even includes a detailed listing of the military equipment 
(and cost in U.S. dollars) for one of these firms engaged to fulfill a particular contract. 15 
The corporate warriors also take casualties that are rarely reported in the news accounts 
of U.S. military personnel. Thus, Mr. Westervelt reported that “slain contractors are not 
counted in the official tally of the U.S. war dead. We don’t know how many private 
contractors have died in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere because the companies and federal 
agencies won’t disclose that.” Characteristically, reported Westervelt, (NPR) “The US State 
Department and DynCorp officials repeatedly declined to be interviewed on the record, 
saying the contracts don’t authorize them to talk to the media.” 
As Charles Lewis, of the Center for Public Integrity observes: “We don’t have 
transparency, bottom line. In the 21st Century in the United States, we’re giving out … 
billions of dollars in contracts and we don’t know who’s getting the money, how much it’ll 
cost and how many years it’ll take and what essentially they’re doing and even who are these 
people. We’re kept in the dark ... And the State Department, in six months of Freedom of 
Information requests, did not give us anything.” 16 
The invention of a privatized military industry, paid for by American citizens but not 
accountable to them at all, had an important start with President Kennedy’s anti-Castro Bay 
of Pigs effort. Military-political plans for the United States were aimed at being prepared for 
fighting “two and a half” wars at one time. Apart from a nuclear war, these were to include a 
conventional European war, as with the U.S.S.R., a Southeast Asian war and a lesser military 
engagement in Latin America (hence the one half). Under President Nixon these goals were 
revised downward to “one and a half” wars, in addition to a nuclear exchange. That was the 
military expression of the U.S. national policy goals that reached out for Pax Americana and 
“world hegemony.” 
These confident estimates were shaken twenty-five years later by the failure to score a 
military win against the guerrillas and the armed forces of impoverished countries in 
Indochina. One of the major byproducts of the U.S. war in Vietnam was a greater readiness 
among many Americans to question the idea that unlimited military power was purchasable 
at will by the government of the United States. 
But, since 9/11 this popular questioning of the privatization of the military and of the 
ability to deploy brute force against insurgencies has been deemed “unpatriotic”. If we forget 
the lessons of history, are we doomed to repeat them? 
 
 
GUERILLA WARFARE 
 
Many nationalist and under-class revolts in less developed countries have 
relied on guerrilla warfare. Such tactics were also part of Europe’s military 
effort against occupation forces during World War II; in Ireland the 
method was used against British rule. The history of guerrilla warfare 
indicates that three elements determine the success of this technique: first, the existence 
of a group of indigenous people prepared to make major personal sacrifices on behalf of a 
common cause; second, support for the guerrilla fighters by a population or part of a 
government; and, third, the ability of the guerrilla forces to look like the noncombatants 
surrounding them. Wherever these three conditions are met, the history of 
guerrilla warfare shows that no available military technology has been able 
to overcome the guerrilla forces militarily, regardless of the scale of 
military power that was applied—unless the occupying power employed 
the instruments of genocide and total population transfer. This has been 
the case where guerrillas have operated in small as well as large countries, 
and against opponents with a relatively moderate tradition of using military 
power, as well as against opponents with a tradition of using military 
power as a terrorist weapon. Guerrilla techniques have been successful 
against opponents with rudimentary as well as sophisticated military 
technology. 17  
During the last decades, major armed forces have been repeatedly 
frustrated by guerrilla-type operations that fulfill the three conditions 
noted above. This was also starkly revealed in the frustration of the 
German Army during the Second World War against the Yugoslav 
guerrillas, and by the frustration of British armed forces in their opposition 
to the guerrilla organization of the Irish Republicans.18  
 
U.S. Forces were similarly frustrated during the Vietnam war, which caused many Americans 
to question the idea that unlimited military power was purchasable at will by the government 
of the United States. For example, initial predictions claimed that a few weeks of bombing in 
North Vietnam would end the war. However, the war continued despite daily American 
bombing that exceeded the tonnages in Europe during WWII. One of the “neoconservative” 
goals for the current war on Iraq has been to shake off the legacy of Vietnam. However, the 
laws of guerilla warfare will hold in Iraq just as they did in Vietnam.  
 
THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM 
There is no question that in every department of weapons technology, American armed 
forces in Iraq, as in Vietnam, enjoy overwhelming superiority.  
 
By 1969, U.S. forces had bombarded North and South Vietnam with 3 
million tons of high explosives (80 percent in the South). This compares 
with 2 million tons of high explosives dropped during the Second World 
War in the European and Pacific theaters of operations combined. 
American soldiers in Vietnam carried six times the firepower of G.I.’s in 
the Second World War, and U.S. forces spent about $400,000 per enemy 
killed (including 75 bombs and 150 artillery shells per corpse). 19  
The guerrilla opponent in Vietnam demonstrated military staying power 
despite the fact that he possessed few heavy weapons, no navy, no air 
force, and nothing like the technically elaborate military and industrial 
infrastructure that supported American and allied armed forces. 20 
During the long Vietnam War, American armed forces did not stint on 
research and development for counterguerrilla operations. The array of 
new-weapons development to facilitate the counterguerrilla operations in 
Vietnam ranged from simple items like new lightweight weapons, footgear 
and protective clothing to elaborate devices to “smell” a possible 
opponent concealed in a jungle, antipersonnel bombs of diverse sorts with 
highly destructive effect, and the operation of great fleets of helicopters. 
The inability of the most elaborately equipped and research-supported 
armed force in the world to overcome the guerrilla forces of a small, poor 
country helps to define a limit on the capabilities of military technology.21 
  
Even as there have been widespread complaints from the troops in Iraq that they lack basic 
equipment, the U.S. military has continued to pour money into high tech hardware. While 
U.S. troops were welding scrap metal onto their under armored Humvee vehicles, the 
American military has deployed robots “to detect and destroy remote controlled bombs that 
have been planted against troops and convoys …” and spent $5 million to buy 20 packbot 
systems, “small robots with acoustical sensors used to support missions against snipers”.22 
There is, however, only so much that technology can do. In The Permanent War Economy I 
stated that to overcome a guerrilla opponent, the elements of successful guerilla warfare, (a 
group that is motivated to die for their cause; support for the group among members of the 
population and; the ability of group members to blend in with the surrounding population) 
must be removed.  
 
If the surrounding population is destroyed, then there is no “sea” in which 
the guerrillas can “swim.” In Vietnam the United States finally turned to 
removing or destroying the populations in areas under guerrilla control. 
The breakthrough to a new level of frightfulness in the pursuit of power in 
Vietnam is illustrated by the destruction of the countryside by 
bombardment and chemical defoliation and the concentration of 
Vietnamese peasants into towns and cities where they could be more 
readily controlled.23 24 
Early in 1965, I made a point of visiting the Secretary of Defense to call 
his attention directly, to the characteristics that make guerrilla warfare 
succeed, and to warn him of the prospect of a military “non-win” for U.S. 
forces in Vietnam, as a consequence of the “counter-insurgency” 
operations. It is important to understand why such analyses and the 
evidence supporting them were disregarded. On one count, the Pentagon 
directorate was confident that they could invent new military and social 
technology that would overcome the advantages specific to a guerrilla 
army. But a second factor was also operative: a will to succeed against 
guerrilla warfare that was so strong as to compel the operators of the U.S. 
war of intervention to overlook the inherent advantages of the guerrilla 
fighters and to seek to overwhelm them either in terms of numbers or 
firepower or both. The Pentagon chiefs deceived themselves and the 
nation about U.S. military capability in Vietnam. 25 
 
In Pentagon Capitalism I cited the 1964 case of mortar attacks conducted against U.S. air 
bases:26  
The military operations at that time, though small in scale and limited in 
number, gave the clue to the guerrilla form of the military-political method 
being used by the Vietcong. In 1964, various mortar attacks against U.S. 
air bases clearly came from populated farm areas. Subsequent search 
operations by South Vietnamese and U.S. forces failed to disclose any 
trace of the mortars, the men who carried them, or the containers in which 
mortar shells were transported to the site. The disappearance of these men 
and their materiel in that area, without a trace, was possible only because 
the population was shielding them. It was physically impossible to move 
these weapons into that area, mount them, fire them, dismantle them and 
move away without being visible to a considerable number of local 
peasants. Evidently, the local peasants preferred to protect the guerrilla 
operators.27 
  
These attacks bear a striking resemblance to those that took place in Iraq during November 
2003.  
 
The attackers used four donkey carts disguised as hay wagons to haul 
homemade multiple rocket-launchers close to several of the most heavily 
defended sites in the city, including the 20-story Palestine and Sheraton 
hotels on the banks of the Tigris River, and the Oil Ministry, which 
manages the resources on which Iraq’s hopes for resurgent oil wealth 
depend. … 
The donkeys were tethered to trees, with the rockets inserted inside home-
made launchers linked to car batteries and time-fuses, and hidden under 
hay. But these “contraptions,” as one American officer called them, were 
armed with powerful battlefield rockets. Several feet long and as big 
around as a fire hose, they were said by American officers to have been 
either Soviet-made 107-millimeter or Brazilian-made 122-millimeter 
rockets, two types that were stockpiled by Mr. Hussein’s army before the 
American invasion. They have a range of up to 10 miles. 
Only luck appeared to have averted far more serious damage. At least 50 
of the rockets failed to fire. Those that did struck with great force. Four 
holes as big as soccer balls were punched in the outer walls of the Palestine 
Hotel, throwing concrete chunks and glass into three upper floors and 
filling corridors with thick, grimy dust. 
At the adjacent Sheraton, a rocket severed the cables of an external, glass-
encased elevator and sent it plunging to the ground, smashing the glass 
roof of the atrium and sending shards showering into the lobby. 
Miraculously, there were no injuries. 
An upper floor of the Oil Ministry caught fire, but there were no reported 
injuries in a building that, unlike the hotels filled with foreign journalists 
and other outsiders, was virtually deserted at the start of a Muslim prayer 
day.28 
 
The three conditions required for successful guerilla warfare are reinforced when there is a 
population that is subjected to great oppression and deprivation in living conditions. This is 
precisely what has been taking place in Iraq.  
Useful details are personally offered by Patrick Dillon, a former U.S. Army medic in 
Vietnam, now a filmmaker and writer, who visited Iraq during 2003. He calls attention to the 
fact that the city of Baghdad prior to the 2003 invasion had sixteen sewage treatment plants, 
of which fourteen were bombed out. Such plants require reliable electric power and 
chemicals by which sewage can be treated with chlorine. In the absence of this capability, 3 
billion gallons of untreated sewage move into the Tigris River every day.  
Drinking water is sold by the bottle and price gouging is a common practice. For the vast 
majority of people there’s nothing left to drink but polluted water, therefore infectious 
disease spreads rapidly and there is a notable increase in infant mortality. 
Dillon reports that the people of Baghdad are a population reduced to a stone-age 
economy – but without a state; therefore without an administrative machine to regulate even 
the most elemental conditions required for an orderly life. Dillon sums up the condition with 
the judgment that the population of Baghdad is being reduced to the image once formulated 
by Pol Pot for the people of Cambodia. Remember, this is being done to a population that 
had been taught that they were the inheritors of creators of modern culture – the written 
word and major branches of science and engineering. 29  
There is no comprehensive estimate of the scale of Iraq’s weaponry stockpiles available to 
guerilla forces. One indicator of what may be involved is related to the Iraqi government’s 
official debt to the Russian government. Iraq owes Russia about $8 billion (Associated Press, 
Dec 22nd, 2003). It is likely that the debt owed to Russia was mainly for the purchase of 
weapons of every sort produced by the Soviet military industry. 
“The CIA has estimated that the weapons dumps found so far in Iraq hold 600,000 tons 
of all kinds of ammunition and weapons.” The Iraqi government’s weapons dumps have also 
included “several hundred shoulder-fired missiles, many in weapons dumps the location of 
which remain secret.” … “The American military is pressing the search for the missiles, 
offering a reward of $500 for each one. The Pentagon has been surprised by how many of 
the weapons, mostly Russian designed SA-7’s the Iraqi’s have turned in … Altogether, 317 
shoulder-fired missiles have been handed over to the military since May 1, (2003) according 
to unclassified United States military figures. The military has paid more than $100,000 in 
rewards the figures show.”.30  
While “American commanders insist they are making headway in bringing order to Iraq, 
… the indications are that the fight will be difficult and prolonged.” The American 
commanders indicate that “most ambushes are initiated by a combination of rocket 
propelled grenades or improvised explosive devices…” The report continues, “The use of 
small-arms fire and rocket propelled grenade attacks, command-detonated improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) and mortar rounds continues to increase; especially the frequency 
of attacks which utilize command detonated improvised explosive devices daisy-chained 
together, buried or hidden along roads or highways.” (New York Times, October 19th 2003). 
A dispatch from Iraq to the New York Times by John F. Burns on December 26, 2003 
included the following, “as fought by the soldiers, this war has little in common with the 
glories memorialized in the camp’s name, drawn from Saint-Mare Église, the Normandy 
town where the 82nd Airborne paratroopers dropped on D-Day in June 1944. Here the 
enemy is shadowy and fleeting, and prepared to use any tactic however brutal to kill and 
wound Americans…”This camp is at the heart of the so-called Sunni Triangle known as 
such for its domination by Sunni Muslims, who remain Mr. Hussein’s strongest loyalists. 
About 90% of all insurgent attacks have been in this area. 
Along Highway 1, the expressway stretching westward past Falluja, shepherds wave at 
passing American convoys, then use doctored cell-phones to detonate 122-mm artillery 
shells fashioned into crude bombs and buried in the median strip or under overpasses. 
Recently, troops at Camp Saint-Mare said a man sent his eight year old son to throw a 
grenade into the back of a Humvee, severely wounding an American soldier.  
John F. Burns reported that most soldiers “seem to think it is winnable although not 
perhaps for several years, longer if ordinary Iraqis keep denying the American-led coalition 
intelligence on the insurgence. … The soldiers’ talk abounded with accounts of near-misses, 
of grenades tossed out of seemingly friendly crowds, of roadside bombs exploding beside 
Humvees.” All these reports are characteristic of the experience of American soldiers 
confronting a guerilla opponent.  
Post traumatic stress disorder is the name that professional psychiatrists gave to the pattern of 
suffering that was so widespread among U.S. Vietnam war veterans. This included recurring 
anxiety, sleeplessness, nightmares and depression severe enough to disrupt a soldier’s life, 
and is often suffered long after the military experience is over. Soldiers suffered alienation 
from both intimates and from the world at large.  Soldiers in Iraq have not gone unscathed.  
  
Though military researchers have estimated that twenty-five percent of the 
soldiers on the front lines of a war will experience combat stress, it seems 
possible that for Iraq the numbers will be even greater… 
‘These troops know no frontline,’ says Alfonso Batres, the clinical 
psychologist in charge of readjustment counseling services for the 206 Vet 
Centers around the country. ‘Its just like Vietnam. They have to be on guard 
with everyone; they’re always facing an unknown. In some ways, fighting a 
conventional war is a lot easier on the psyche.’ 31 
 
Back at home, soldiers with post traumatic stress disorder have troubles adjusting to civilian life. 
Thus, as journalist Sarah Corbett has noted, sharp noises such as a dropped cafeteria tray or 
a backfiring car can cause these men and women to react as though under attack, diving for 
cover or searching for assailants. The full extent of such damage done to U.S. soldiers who 
have served in Iraq, will not be known until long after the troops come home. 
As America’s state managers devised military plans for world hegemony, they came to 
believe that the American production machine could deliver invincible military power that 
they could wield anywhere on earth. That included the world’s largest stockpile of nuclear 
weapons, whose very existence under their control has been judged to be a fearsome 
instrument for power wielding. All the while, American state managers were unable 
(unwilling) to contemplate limits to their military power. To their dismay, their war in 
Vietnam was a failure. But they continue to pursue the same strategy in Iraq. Their multi-
billion dollar budgets were no match for the weapons of guerilla warfare. But polite 
discussion has not permitted confronting these realities in American schools and the media. 
While the terrible costs of this U.S. drive for global hegemony can often seem far away, 
viewed through the lens of a compliant media, half a century of permanent war economy has 
wrought a heavy toll close to home: in the shape of deindustrialization and the hollowing out 
of U.S. infrastructure. We will explore this damage, as well as possible strategies for change, 
in the following chapters.  
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